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NOTES
NEW GUIDELINES FOR ADMIRALTY TORT JURISDICTION
Federal judicial power over maritime torts was created by article
III, § 2, of the United States Constitution, and effectuated by the
Judiciary Act of 1789.' Since that time, many attempts have been made
to formulate practical tests which would enable the federal courts to deter-
mine which tort actions properly fall within admiralty jurisdiction.
Such tests should be based upon those attributes of the maritime
industry and admiralty law which motivated the Constitution's framers
to expressly create federal maritime jurisdiction.2 However, previous
tests have failed to properly draw jurisdictional lines, largely because
they have bypassed this examination. In Peytavin v. Gov't Employee's
Ins. Co.,' the court appears to have finally set out a test which enables
accurate jurisdictional classification. To properly judge the merits of
the Peytavin test, consideration must first be given to the traditional
justifications for maritime jurisdiction.
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR MARITIME JURISDICTION
One traditional rationale for maintaining a separate admiralty juris-
diction is the federal interest in the uniform application of maritime law.
At the time of the Constitutional Convention, the idea of a separate United
States admiralty court was barely emerging. Yet, concern for the uniform
administration of the general maritime law made it clear that international
and interstate transactions on navigable waters would raise questions re-
quiring resort to the law of nations and maritime commerce.4 Uniformity
in this area was essential for the smooth flow of commerce among nations
and states. A young nation could ill-afford being out of step with the in-
ternational trading market. It was also recognized that this uniformity
could not be attained by the conflicting and changing rules developed in
state courts under the Articles of Confederation. Thus, the submission of
1. An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States § 9, ch. 20, §
9, 1 Stat. 73 (1789), as ameided 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970).
2. G. GInaom & C. BLACK, JR., THE LAW or ADMIRALTY 26-27 (1957) [herein-
after cited as GImo0RE].
3. 453 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1972).
4. 1 E. C. BENEDICT, BENEDICT ON ADmRALTY § 10, at 14 (6th ed. A. W. Knauth
1940) [hereinafter cited as BENEDICT].
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maritime cases to a federal judiciary was deemed essential,' as evidenced
by the fact that admiralty is specifically included in the jurisdictional
section of the Constitution.'
Although the desire for uniformity explains why maritime cases
should be handled by the federal judiciary, it does not completely explain
the necessity of a separate body of law. The answer lies in the special
complexity of maritime business relations which require a tribunal en-
joying a particular expertise and applying separate legal doctrines."
Since the Middle Ages the law applicable to maritime affairs has been
regarded as logically and practically separate from ordinary municipal
law,' and has retained an international flavor.' Despite advances in
navigation, the maritime industry is still plagued by hazards and prob-
lems similar to those which dictated the need for a separate maritime law
in the Middle Ages. Thus, retention of separate jurisdiction is justified
by
practical realities . . . and the overriding goal of perpetuating
the vitally important maritime industry. The maritime industry
is still to a large extent, transient, far-flung and fraught with
perils. Those dealing with that industry. . . are, consequently,
entitled to remedies and defenses peculiarly fitted to such ven-
tures and should not be subjected to the idiosyncracies of each
ports' local law. .. .
5. Id.
6. Black, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Critique and Suggestions, 50 COLUm. L. Rav.
259, 262 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Black].
7. Id. at 280. The suggestion that the expertise of admiralty judges is increased
by virtue of separate admiralty jurisdiction is open to criticism. Whether the juris-
diction is separate or not, the same judges decide the case. However, it would appear
that the separation of admiralty increases expertise somewhat by forcing the courts
to take particular cognizance of the maritime nature of the case. Furthermore, any
advantage to be gained by having admiralty cases heard by a single maritime court or
agency is outweighed by the disadvantages: a centralized agency or court would be
inconvenient for litigants; the traveling costs involved might be prohibitive; and the
delays would hinder business. In any event there is nothing to suggest that any change
in the present system is soon forthcoming. Id. at 280.
8. GILMORE, supra note 2, at 2-4; W. S. HoLDSwORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAw 526-30 (7th ed. A. L. Goodhart & H. G. Hanbury 1956) [hereinafter cited as
HoLDswoRTH]; D. W. ROBERTSON, ADMIRALTY AND FmDEl.Ism 35-43 (1970) [herein-
after cited as ROBERTSON].
9. Dodd, The New Doctrine of the Supremacy of Admiralty Over the Commn
Law, 21 CoLum. L. REv. 647 (1921).
10. Pelaez, Admiralty Tort Jurisdiction--The Last Barrier, 7 DuQUESNE L. REv.
1, 42-43 (1968) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as Pelaez]. In passing, it
should be noted that admiralty jurisdiction offers many distinct advantages. It
enables the libellant to gain access to the federal courts without proof of diversity
or amount in controversy. See The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S. 17, 33 (1903);
Peytavin v. Government Employees Ins. Corp., 453 F.2d 1121, 1122 (5th Cir. 1972).
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THIE HISTORICAL TEST FOR ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION:
STRICT LOCALITY
Any test which purports to establish the boundaries of admiralty
tort jurisdiction must insure that the cases it selects involve those
torts, . . . [which] . . in the whole range from the most
literally physical to the purely commercial, are so related to
the conduct of the maritime industry that the federal interest
in that industry may best be implemented by drawing them
into the admiralty jurisdiction. 1
The Court of Admiralty in England during the Middle Ages
The libellant may commence his suit in any district where he can obtain service upon
the respondent or attach a lien upon the ship. Pelaez, supra at 1. Since admiralty
substantive law is applied in all maritime cases, a suitor can avoid all choice of law
problems. These special rules were developed to allow for the redress of wrongs done
by ships which, under the civil law, would be impossible to obtain because of the
ambulatory nature of a ship. Id. at 1-2.
Another important advantage found in admiralty is the use of the doctrine of
comparative negligence. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953) ; The Max
Morris, 137 U.S. 1 (1890); Byrd v. Napoleon Ave. Ferry Co., 125 F. Supp. 573
(E.D. La. 1954), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 925 (1956). Moreover, by bringing suit in
admiralty, one can use maritime liens, which were first introduced to secure loans to
shipowners:
Ships require a vast and bewildering various amount of supply and repair.
An outgoing ship will normally have taken on some stores and fuel for her
voyage at the port of lading. She will have run up a wharfage bill, and
incurred various port fees. She will have been loaded by stevedores. She
will probably be taken out by a pilot, and assisted at the start of her voyage
by tugs. From time to time she will have to be repainted and repaired.
A host of special callings and industries has arisen to furnish these and a
hundred other supplies and services, and maritime liens are granted to secure
payment.
Gmsxop, supra note 2, at 16.
The maritime lien thus insures that
the party aggrieved has a speedy, certain and efficacious remedy in his
lien upon the offending thing, and his right to arrest it and subject it to
the payment of his claim. The vessel may be a foreign one, departing perhaps
never to return, or the owner may be unknown or reside abroad. But so long
as she remains in port, libellant's remedy is unimpaired.
Brown, Jurisdiction of the Admiralty in Cases of Tort, 9 CoLUM. L. Rynv. 1, 11 (1909)
[hereinafter cited as Brown].
Finally, jury trial is not required and statutes of limitations are not applicable
(although the doctrine of laches may apply). Parties may desire to use these features
for tactical reasons.
11. Black, supra note 6, at 264 n.30; acord, Stolz, Pleasure Boating and Ad-
iniralty: Erie at Sea, 51 CALiF. L. REv. 661 (1963).
In other words, there is more than a fortuitous relationship between commerce
and admiralty; if there is no commercial element involved-if the people who
make their living by transporting cargo or passengers could not care less-
there is no reason to apply admiralty law.
Id. at 665.
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handled practically all mercantile and shipping cases. 2 Its powers ex-
tended to torts committed on the sea, on the public rivers, and to all
cases of collision.'" Legal concepts applied by this court were derived
from the civil law admiralty classics,' 4 thereby injecting civil law mari-
time principles into English law, a feature which still remains." How-
ever, in the 16th century the English admiralty court began a decline
which continued for two centuries.'6 Led by Lord Coke, the common
law courts limited admiralty's jurisdiction, thus eradicating many of
the civil law features.' By strictly construing "done on the sea" in the
existing statutes, Coke restricted admiralty jurisdiction over contracts
so that even those covering a maritime subject matter, if made on the
land, were placed within common law jurisdiction.'"
When the Constitution was drafted, admiralty jurisdiction in
England was still in its period of eclipse, and the maritime law in this
country was administered by the states. 9 The state-operated system
was so unsatisfactory that it led to a demand for federal jurisdiction
over cases in admiralty :20 the Constitution granted power to the federal
judiciary over "all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction."
DeLovio v. Boilt2 was the first case determining the scope of this
language. In this case the circuit court was faced with the problem
of determining whether English maritime law was to be followed when
12. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 8, at 552. In fact, the admiralty court was recognized
as one of the tribunals of the law merchant. Id.
13. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 8, at 552.
14. G. H. ROBINSON, HANDBOOK OF ADMIRALTY LAW 4 (1939) [hereinafter cited
as HANDBOOK]. The Admiralty Classics were composed of the Law of Oleron, the
Law of Wisbuy, and the Ordinance of Louis XIV. See also HOLDSWORTHi, supra note
8, at 559.
15. Note, Admiralty Jurisdiction Over Torts, 25 HARv. L. REv. 381 (1912)
[hereinafter cited as Harvard Note]. See also GILMORE, supra note 2, at 31.
16. GILMORE, supra note 2, at 9.
17. HoLDswoRTH, supra note 8, at 553-55. The attack of the common law courts
was prompted by a number of factors. Since the admiralty courts were encumbered
with fewer procedural restraints than the common law courts, the admiralty courts
attracted many litigants. Chamlee, An Introduction to Admiralty, 22 MERcER L. REv.
523 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Chamlee]. The resulting loss of fees by the common
law courts certainly helped to stimulate their attack. Id.; HoLDswoRTHr, supra note
8, at 553-555; ROBERTSON, supra note 8, at 33; Note, From Judicial Grant to Legis-
lative Power: The Admiralty Clause in the Nineteenth Century, 67 HARV. L. REV.
1214, 1216 n.17 (1954). However, it appears that the foremost reason for the attack
was based in the fact that admiralty courts did not afford litigants the right to jury
trial. Common law courts believed that the right to jury trial was an essential safe-
guard against the power of the monarchy. Therefore, they sought to bring as many
litigants as possible within their jurisdiction. ROBERTSON, supra note 8, at 104.
18. GILMORE, supra note 2, at 9; HOLDsVWoRTH, supra note 8, at 553-54.
19. Chamlee, suipra note 17, at 523-24.
20. ROBERTSON, supra note 8, at 100-01.
21. 7 F. Cas. 418 (No. 3776) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (Story, Circuit Justice).
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construing the constitutional provision. By placing all land-made
contracts outside of admiralty law, the English approach greatly re-
stricted admiralty jurisdiction. 2 Justice Story decided that this severe
restriction did not apply in the United States. 3 He held that in contract
cases, locality was not the test and, henceforth, jurisdiction over con-
tracts would be determined by reference to "the maritime relation of its
subject matter."'24 Story interpreted the word "maritime," when added
to "cases of admiralty," to expand admiralty contract jurisdiction to the
full extent exercised on the Continent.23
However, Story did not limit his discussion to contract jurisdic-
tion. He also briefly dealt with maritime tort jurisdiction and, in dicta,
abandoned the civil law approach. Story stated that tort cases were
"necessarily bounded by locality,"2 although he did not attempt to ex-
plain why the subject matter test must be used to determine contract,
but not tort, jurisdiction.
The conclusion that tort jurisdiction is dependent upon locality
was not inevitable. 8 English admiralty had developed from Continental
law, and Story recognized that the Constitution did not prohibit resort
to European precedent. 9 In France, for example, the test of jurisdiction
for tort, as well as for contract, depended upon the maritime nature
of the dispute."0 Since English and American admiralty courts owe
22. HOLnswoRr, supra note 8, at 553-55.
23. 7 F. Cas. at 444. See Deutsch, Development of the Theory of Admiralty Juris-
diction in thle United States, 35 TuL. L. REv. 117, '118 (1960).
24. 7 F. Cas. at 442, 444.
25. 7 F. Cas. at 441, 443. See also BENEDiCT, supra note 4, § 5, at 6-7.
26. 7 F. Cas. at 444. It appears that the "uncompromising spirit of the old common-
law judges in the tradition of Coke and Holt was still exercising at least a remote
measure of influence" on Justice Story when he adopted the territorial limitation in
tort cases. Farnum, Admiralty Jurisdiction and Amphibious Torts, 43 YALE L.J.
34, 37 (1933).
27. See generally Swain, Yes, Virginia, There Is An Admiralty: The Rodrique
Case, 16 LOYOLA L. Rav. 43, 60-61 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Swain]. A possible
explanation for this result is that Story felt politically constrained to limit admiralty
tort jurisdiction. At the time expansion of federal power through judicial pronounce-
ments was greatly criticised. This probably explains Story's holding in The Steam-
boat Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat) 428 (1825), that admiralty in the United
States was limited to waters within the "ebb and flow" of the tide. His decision was
based on the idea that the historic English rule should apply to the United States.
(In The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 442 (1851), The
Thomas Jefferson was in effect overruled on the ground that the "ebb and flow"
limitation was based upon the peculiar geographical position of England and should
not be applied in the United States.) Since Story worked to have The Thomas Jefferson
rule changed by Congress, the theory that he felt politically limited in making juris-
dictional decisions seems valid.
28. See Black, sutra note 6, at 264; Pelaez, supra note 10, at 3-5; Swain, supra
note 27, at 61.
29. 7 F. Cas. at 441, 443.
30. Harvard Note, suPra note 15, at 381.
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their origins to civil law sources,"' Story could have adopted a test of
jurisdiction based on the maritime nature of the tort. Instead, without
mentioning the alternative, Story fell prey to the simplistic approach
developed in the English common law. He treated the locality of the
tort as determinative, even though territorial jurisdiction was unknown
in Continental law, and only arose as part of the historical development
of the common law.82
Since the uniform and consistent administration of maritime law,
and the peculiar complexity of the subject matter are the justifications
for having a separate admiralty jurisdiction,88 the locality test can be
defended only if it leads to results which are consistent with these pur-
poses. The locality test has failed in this respect. Despite its alleged
ease of application, 4
[t]he strict locality theory of admiralty tort jurisdiction has
never proved wholly satisfactory. Because it is in no way
geared to the problems of the maritime industry itself, it often
causes bizzarre [sic] results contrary to the very purposes of
the admiralty."5
Under the locality test, a court must decide whether the tort occurred
on navigable waters or on land. This decision involves a factual deter-
mination dependent upon the court's choice of locality as the place (1)
where the negligent act was committed, (2) where the damage occurred,
or (3) where the impact of the negligent act first came to rest.," Courts
did not reach consistent locality determinations, thus subverting an im-
portant goal of a separate admiralty jurisdiction.
The inconsistency between the underlying purposes of maritime
law and the locality test's result can be traced to The Plymouth,87
which was the first case to clearly adopt the locality test. The court held
that a suit in admiralty did not lie where damage occurs on land, even
if the damage was caused by the negligent operation of a vessel.8"
31. Id. See GmoRE, supra note 2, at 1-11.
32. Harvard Note, supra note 15, at 381.
33. See notes 4-10 supra & text accompanying.
34. Note, Admiralty Jurisdiction Over Torts, 16 HARv. L. RFv. 210, 211 (1903)
[hereinafter cited as Over Torts] ; Note, Admiralty-Tests of Maritime Tort Juris-diction, 44 TUL. L. Rxv. 166, 167 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Admiralty Tests] ; Com-
ment, Torts Along the Water's Edge: Admiralty or Land Jurisdiction?, 1968 U. IL.a
L.F. 95, 98 (1968) ; Comment, Admiralty Jurisdiction in Cases of Tort, 23 WAsH. &
LEE L. REV. 345, 347 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Wash. & Lee Note].
35. Pelaez, supra note 10, at 36.
36. See HANDBoox, supra note 14, at 77; Swain, supra note 27, at 61.
37. 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1866).
38. Id. at 36.
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Similarly, in Johnson v. Chicago and Pacific Elevator Company,9
the court held that the tort occurred on land where the jib boom of a
schooner struck and danmaged a warehouse, causing a quantity of corn
to be lost in the river." Despite the fact that both the negligence and
the loss occurred on navigable waters, the fact that it resulted in damage
to the warehouse on land intervened to preclude jurisdiction. Thus, the
tort was localized
at the point where the defendant's force came into contact with
the thing injured, notwithstanding that even the principal
damage occurred by the resulting precipitation of something
into the water. 1
Johnson is in direct conflict with the result in The City of Lincoln."
In that case overloading resulted in the collapse of a wharf, causing
libellant's property to be dumped into the water. The court held that
admiralty had jurisdiction because the tort was consummated on the
water."3 Certainly, a test which yields such strangely contradictory re-
sults is not adequately promoting the purposes underlying admiralty
jurisdiction.
The same problems have arisen in cases of personal injuries. In
T. Smith and Son, Inc. v. Taylor," a longshoreman, on a projection of
a wharf, was struck by a cargo sling mounted on the vessel, knocked
into the water and killed. The court denied maritime jurisdiction, reason-
ing that the event giving rise to the action occurred on the wharf, an
extension of the land." Although the negligent act (1) originated on
a vessel resting on water, (2) occurred in the course of maritime work,
(3) arose under a maritime contract, and (4) caused death to occur in
navigable waters, the case was held outside maritime jurisdiction merely
because the blow occurred while the deceased was on land. Yet, what
could be more a part of maritime commerce than a longshoreman unload-
ing a ship? 6
39. 119 U.S. 388 (1886).
40. Id. at 397.
41. HANDuOOIm, sipra note 14, at 78.
42. 25 F. 835 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1885).
43. Id. at 837. Cf. The Haxby, 95 F. 170, 171 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1899). In Haxby
property was thrown into the water when a steamer struck a pier. Compare Haxby
with The Strabo, 98 F. 998 (2d Cir. 1900), where it was reasoned that whether the
injury occurred on the wharf or in the water was irrelevant because the injury was
inevitable once the chain of events had been set in motion.
44. 276 U.S. 179 (1928).
45. Id.
46. The court in T. Smith "explained" its result by pointing out that it insured
that the decedent's widow could recover under the Louisiana compensation law. 276
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The so-called "ladder cases" also demonstrate the inconsistent re-
sults obtained when applying the locality test. In The Strabo,4 7 the
libellant sustained injuries when he fell off a ladder extending from the
ship to the dock. Although the circuit court purported to follow The
Plymouth,"8 recovery was allowed in admiralty. The court actually re-
structured the locality test, holding that the tort need not be consummated
on navigable waters49 as long as the wrongful act was put in motion
and took effect totally on board ship." A contrary decision was reached
in H.S. Pickands.5" In this case the libellant was hurt when he fell to the
pier from a ladder extending from the vessel to the wharf; the accident
occurring when the ship's master shifted the ladder. Since the slippage of
the ladder occurred on land, the court held that insufficient grounds
existed for maritime jurisdiction : 2 the tort was not consummated and
the damage was not suffered on navigable water.
The numerous court-made and congressional exceptions to the
U.S. at 181-182. However, an opposite result was reached in another compensation
case, Interlake Steamship Co. v. Nielsen, 338 F.2d 879 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381
U.S. 934, rehearing denied, 382 U.S. 873 (1965), where decedent was killed
when he drove his automobile onto the frozen water of Lake Erie. Libellant was
allowed to recover under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Act, 33 U.S.C. §
901 et seq. (1970). The fact that the impetus of the harm originated on land was held
to be irrelevant because the harm occurred on navigable water. A result inconsistent
with the result in T. Sinith was also reached in Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co.,
295 U.S. 647 (1935). In Minnie, a longshoreman was injured when he was struck by
a hoist and thrown from the ship to the land. The court found admiralty jurisdiction.
The propensity of the locality test to produce anomalous results is also illustrated
by several decisions involving claims of unseaworthiness against ships. In Gutierrez
v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 373 U.S. 206, rehearing denied, 374 U.S. 858 (1963),
a longshoreman was injured on the dock by his employer's equipment while he was
unloading the ship. A suit in admiralty was allowed. In Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,
328 U.S. 85, rehearing denied, 328 U.S. 878 (1946), an unseaworthiness claim in
admiralty was allowed where a longshoreman was injured on a ship in the course of
the unloading process. But in Victory Carriers Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, rehearing
denied, 404 U.S. 1064 (1971), recovery in admiralty was denied to a longshoreman
injured as a result of a defect in his employer's forklift. The injury occurred on a pier
while the longshoreman was moving cargo to be loaded on the ship later by the ship's
equipment. The unseaworthiness claim against the ship was rejected on the ground
that the injury did not occur on navigable waters, or fall within the scope of The
Admiralty Extension Act of 1948, 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1970).
Thus, under the locality test, injuries resulting from the same type of maritime
activity and occurring in essentially the same manner will be treated differently in
deciding jurisdictional questions. The test has only served to increase complication
and uncertainty in the law. Regrettably, statutory changes, such as the Longshore-
man's Act, have compounded the problem. See White, The Admiralty Jurisdiction
Adrift, 28 U. PiTT. L. Rv. 635, 641 (1967).
47. 98 F. 998 (2d Cir. 1900).
48. 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 i 1866).
49. 98 F. at 999-1000.
50. Id. at 1000.
51. 42 F. 239 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1890).
52. Id. at 240.
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locality rule serve as further evidence of the test's inadequacy. Perhaps
the first judicial exception to the locality rule was made in The Black-
heath." In that case recovery was allowed in admiralty because the
structure damaged was an aid to navigation, although it was firmly at-
tached to the land and arguably within the "extension of the land" rule."
The court looked beyond locality, holding that the purpose and use of the
structure were determinative." But the court did not attempt to explain
how a navigational beacon, built on piles, differs substantially from a
dock or wharf similarly supported."
Statutory changes to the locality rule have also been created.
It was early noticed that often a strict application of the locality
test had the rather unsettling tendency of excluding from the
admiralty jurisdiction torts very closely connected with acti-
vities obviously maritime, while at the same time including
within that jurisdiction matters not even remotely connected
with maritime commerce or navigation."
For this reason, Congress in 1948 passed the Admiralty Extension Act"
which enlarged admiralty jurisdiction to include all cases of damage
caused by vessels on navigable waters. 9 The Act effectively overruled
53. 195 U.S. 361 (1904). See also The Raithmoor, 241 U.S. 166 (1916).
54. The "extension of the land" doctrine prevented recovery in admiralty for
personal injuries which occurred on, or for property damage to, piers, bridges, wharves,
and similar structures. See generally BENEDICr, supra note 4, § 128(a), at 354-56.
55. 195 U.S. at 365. See Wash. & Lee Note, supra note 34, at 348-49.
Another judicially-created exception to the locality rule was the "maritime but
local" doctrine. This doctrine allows application of state death compensation acts
irrespective of the locality of the tort, provided that the court finds the nature of the
injury to be primarily a matter of local concern. See generally GILMORE, supra note
2, at 344-58; HANDBOOc, supra note 14, at 101-09.
The relationship between state legislative enactments and federal maritime law has
been a difficult and persistent problem. The "maritime but local" doctrine attempted
to strike a balance between the two, and the doctrine has been included in the Longshore-
men's Act. 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1970).
The doctrine was best enunciated in Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rhode, 257
U.S. 469 (1922). However, it never proved satisfactory. See Parker v. Motor Boats
Sales Inc., 314 U.S 244, rehearing denied, 314 US. 716 (1941). In Davis v. Department
of Labor and Indus., 317 U.S. 249, rehearing denied, 317 U.S. 713 (1942), the court
adopted the "twilight zone" doctrine which, in essence, is a case-by-case approach to
those cases in which state compensation acts overlap federal statutes. But see Calbeck v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114 (1962).
56. See Hough, Admiralty Jurisdiction--Of Late Years, 37 HAgv. L. REv. 529,
533 (1924).
57. Palaez, supra note 10, at 23.
58. Pub. L. No. 695, ch. 526, 62 Stat. 496 (1948) (codified at 46 U.S.C. § 740).
59. The scope of admiralty jurisdiction had previously been extended by the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Act to include injuries suffered by longshoremen
in the course of maritime employment. Pub. L. No. 803, ch. 509, § 1, 44 Stat. 1424
(1927), as amended 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (1970).
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The Plymouth, although the locality test survived.
The judicial and congressional exceptions demonstrate a willing-
ness to limit the locality test in the interest of public policy and were
prompted by the test's inadequacy. Despite these exceptions, its in-
adequacies remain. Davis v. City of Jacksonville Beach" held that ad-
miralty had jurisdiction over a suit by a swimmer for injuries suffered
when he was struck by respondent's surfboard. While the court admitted
that the accident had no relation to shipping or maritime commerce, it
reasoned that a surfboard is used upon the high seas or navigable waters
and thus has an inherent potential for interfering with commerce."'
This is the sort of reductio ad absurdum to which the locality rule
leads. In another recent case," a water skier was allowed access to mari-
time jurisdiction in an action against the boat operator who had towed
him, for injuries suffered in a fall. Surely no one can assert that this
suit had a substantial impact on the business of shipping. The court did
not even pretend that the case involved potential maritime interference as
did the Davis court, but merely applied the test mechanically.6"
Despite a growing body of precedent applying the locality test, it
continues to be criticized as an historical anomaly,6" since such a rule
is nowhere present in the sea codes from which we draw our maritime
law.65
"[L]ocality" 
. . . is, to engage in understatement, a patent
absurdity. . . . [L]ines must be drawn. . . . But the lines
drawn . . . should at the very least be rational. Locality as a
criterion for admiralty jurisdiction . . . has nothing . . . to
[recommend it]. . . . It serves neither the needs of federalism
60. 251 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Fla. 1965).
61. Id. at 328.
62. King v. Testerman, 214 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
63. The application of the locality test to airplane crashes at sea has created a
new area of confusion and inconsistency. For example, Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines,
Inc., 316 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 940 (1963), applied the strict
locality rule in determining whether admiralty jurisdiction existed. The court held that
if the crash occurred on navigable waters, the claim must be in admiralty. Id. at 765.
See also Scott v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 399 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1961), eert. denied, 393
U.S. 979 (1968); Thomas v. United Air Lines, Inc., 24 N.Y.2d 714, 249 N.E.2d 755,
301 N.Y.S.2d 973, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 991 (1969).
A well-developed body of legal rules for dealing with air crashes presently exists.
Such rules arose to deal with the needs of the airline industry and its passengers, and
were based on policy considerations appropriate to that industry. See cases in W.
PRossER, LAW OF ToRTs § 39, at 216 (4th ed. 1971). To treat crashes occurring on
water differently from those on land causes non-uniform results in analytically
similar situations; therefore, air crashes should not be admitted to admiralty.
64. Palaez, supra note 10, at 5.
65. Harvard Note, supra note 15, at 381-82.
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nor the reasonable expectations of those concerned with mari-
time affairs."s
IN SEARCH OF A BETTER TEST
In early cases, the Supreme Court adopted Justice Story's dictum in
DeLovio v. Boit,17 and decided that the test for tort jurisdiction in ad-
miralty depended on the locality of the tort.08 However, the court has
never treated the locality test as exclusive. 9 As a result, a difference now
exists between the Supreme Court and some circuits which retain only
the locality test,70 and other circuits which reject locality in favor of
newer tests.7'
The first new test to be judicially adopted was the "locality plus
66. Swain, supra note 27, at 84. Accord, A MucAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF
THE DivisIoN OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS § 1316, Comment
(1968) [hereinafter cited as ALI].
67. 7 F. Cas. 418 (No. 3776) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (Story, Circuit Justice).
68. The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20, 36 (1866).
69. If more is required than the locality of the wrong in order to give the
court jurisdiction, the relation of the wrong to maritime service, to navigation,
and to commerce on navigable waters, was quite sufficient.
Atlantic Transport Co. of W. Va. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52, 62 (1914). See also
GILMORE, supra note 2, at 22 n.78; RoBRTso, supra note 8, at 120-21.
The efficacy of the locality test as the sole test for tort jurisdiction was early
questioned. Campbell v. Hackfield and Co., 125 F. 696 (9th Cir. 1903). See also
BENEDICT, supra note 4, § 127, at 351; Black, supra note 6.
In his "celebrated doubt", Professor Benedict stated with reference to the locality
test that
[i]t has nevertheless been doubted whether the civil admiralty jurisdiction,
in cases of tort, does not depend upon the relation of the parties to some ship
or vessel and embrace only those tortious violations of maritime right and
duty which occur in relation to vessels to which the admiralty jurisdiction
in cases of contract applies. If one of several landsmen bathing in the sea
should assault or imprison or rob another, it has not been held that admiralty
would have jurisdiction of an action for the tort.
BENEDICT, supra note 4, § 127, at 351.
Extending this idea, Professor Black has proposed the following test for juris-
diction in admiralty:
(1) In contract, all those cases involving the enforcement, policing, or ad-
justment of business arrangements as a practical matter primarily concerned
with sea, lake and river transport. (2) In tort, all those cases seeking relief
for tortious conduct with respect to the subject-matter of (1), or for injuries
by or to vessels or other maritime objects, or injuries to persons taking place
in connection with the conduct of the business or shipping.
Black, supra note 6, at 274.
70. Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, rehearing denied, 404 U.S. 1064
(1971); Davis v. City of Jacksonville Beach, 251 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Fla. 1965);
King v. Testerman, 214 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
71. Peytavin v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 453 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1972)
("maritime connection"); Chapman v. City of Grosse Pointe Farms, 385 F.2d 962
(6th Cir. 1967) ("locality-plus") ; Smith v. Guerrant, 290 F. Supp. 111 (S.D. Te.
1968) ("maritime connection"); McGuire v. City of New York, 192 F. Supp. 866
(S.D. N.Y. 1961) ("locality-plus").
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maritime cofinection" test."' Courts applying this test assert that location
of the tort on navigable waters is merely prima facie proof of admiralty
jurisdiction and only torts which also deal with maritime matters are
properly considered.73  Application of the locality-plus test has dictated
denial of jurisdiction for injuries suffered by swimmers7' and divers75
which would have been within admiralty under the locality test. Never-
theless, it is doubtful whether the locality-plus test is a substantial im-
provement since the court never reaches the issue of maritime connection
unless the locality criterion is first satisfied.7 ' Thus, many cases de-
serving consideration in admiralty are excluded by this test. It is clear
that the locality-plus test is a compromise effort, attempting to con-
sider the needs of the maritime industry while still deferring to the
historical test.
Another proposed standard is the maritime connection test. This
test focuses on connection alone to determine tort jurisdiction, allowing
a determination of whether the special duties, remedies, and substantive
rules of admiralty should apply.7" Abandoning locality enables the ex-
tension of admiralty jurisdiction to cases like The Plymouth without
legislation. The test also allows flexibility to adjust the scope of ad-
miralty jurisdiction to meet the changing needs of technology and newly
emerging policy considerations."
Despite its potential for confining tort jurisdiction to cases having a
72. See, e.g., Campbell v. Hackfield & Co., 125 F. 696 (9th Cir. 1903). The best
description of the test remains that of Lord Esher in The Queen v. The Judge of The
City of London Court:
On what does the jurisdiction of the Admiralty Court depend? It does not
depend merely on the fact that something has taken place on the high seas.
That it happened there is, no doubt, irrespectively of statute, a necessary
condition for the jurisdiction of the Admiralty Court; but there is the further
question, what is the subject matter of that which has happened on the high
seas? It is not everything which takes place on the high seas which is within
the jurisdiction of the Admiralty Court. A third consideration is, with
regard to whom is the jurisdiction asserted? You have to consider three
things-the locality, the subject-matter of the complaint, and the person
with regard to whom the complaint is made.
[1892] 1 Q.B. 273, 294-95 (1891). All of the factors considered relevant by Esher are
included in the Peytavin formulation, although Peytavin greatly minimizes the locality
concept.
73. McGuire v.-City of New York, 192 F. Supp. 866, 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
74. Id.
75. Chapman v. City of Grosse Pointe Farms, 385 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1967).
76. Executive Jet Aviation v. City of Cleveland, 448 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1971),
cert. granted, 405 U.S 915 (1972).
77. Smith v. Guerrant, 290 F. Supp. 111 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
78. It has often been stated that using the same test for contracts and torts would
enable litigants to use alternate grounds in bringing actions arising out of the same
maritime transaction. See Pelaez, .supra note 10, at 36-43. Cf. Smith v. Guerrant, 290
F. Supp. 111 (S.D. Tex. 1968) ; ALI, suepra note 66; Swain, supra note 27, at 85.
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clear impact on the maritime industry, the maritime connection test has
been criticized as being difficult to apply, uncertain, and complicated."'
This criticism has been partly motivated by the failure of proponents of
the maritime connection test to adequately develop guidelines for its ap-
plication. The failure accounts for judicial reluctance in accepting the
test, since similar failures led to lack of uniformity under the locality
test.80
PEYTAVIN V. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE'S INSURANCE CO.
The substantial maritime connection test was finally refined by the
fifth circuit in Peytavin v. Gov't Employee's Ins. Co."' There, the
plaintiff was waiting in his car to purchase tickets for a ferry crossing.
The car was resting on a floating pontoon, moored to the shore, from
which the ferry sold its tickets. While driving onto the pontoon the
defendant's car struck the plaintiff's car.82 The unique situation of an
automobile accident on navigable waters83 afforded the court the oppor-
tunity to investigate the three existing tests for admiralty jurisdiction.
Since the injury occurred on a pontoon floating in navigable waters,
application of the strict locality test would require that admiralty enter-
tain the case. But the court refused to follow that test, reasoning that:
79. Over Torts, supra note 34, at 211; Admiralty Tests, supra note 34, at 172. It
has been suggested constitutional problems might arise if "maritime connection" is used
to allow torts committed totally on land to fall within admiralty. Id. at 173. But this
argument loses much of its force when it is recognized that cases occurring totally on
land have already been decided in admiralty. See, e.g., Holland v. Harrison Bros. Dry
Dock & Repair Yard, Inc., 306 F.2d 369, modified on rehearing, 308 F.2d 570 (5th Cir.
1962) ; United States v. Matson Navigation Co., 201 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1953) ; Costello
v. Argonaut Trading Agency, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). Furthermore,
if a suit is clearly connected to admiralty concerns, no constitutional problems should
arise.
80. Cf. The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1866).
81. 453 F.2d 1121, 1126 (5th Cir. 1972).
82. Id. at 1125-26. If the "extension of the land" doctrine had applied, the
case clearly would have fallen outside admiralty jurisdiction. Evansville & Bowling
Green Packet Co. v. Chero Cola Bottling Co., 271 U.S. 19 (1926). See BEN IcT, .rupra
note 4, § 128(a), at 354-56. In ruling that the doctrine was inapplicable, the court re-
lied on Hastings v. Mann, 340 F.2d 910, 911-12 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
963 (1965) See also Chevron Oil v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971); Rodrigue v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 360 (1969).
83. The problem raised by the facts of Peytavin is similar to that suggested by
the hypothetical of Professor Benedict which formed the basis for his "celebrated
doubt." See note 69 supra. A similar hypothetical was also suggested by Justice
Brown, who questioned whether a libel or a slander circulated on board a ship would
give rise to admiralty jurisdiction. Brown, supra note 10, at 8.
Analytically, the automobile accident between two passengers on a floating pontoon,
arguably a vessel, is similar to the hypotheticals mentioned because no person associated
with admiralty is involved. Thus, as Justice Brown states, "such cases are peculiarly
matters within the jurisdiction of common law courts, and a trial by jury." Id.
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[a]pplication of the "strict locality" test fails to provide any
clear guidance because the rule is only as precise as the court's
ability to determine "the location."84
Since the accident occurred on navigable waters while maritime facilities
were being used, the locality plus maritime connection test " would have
arguably placed the case within admiralty jurisdiction. However, for
similar reasons the court rejected this test, reasoning that this standard
led to the "combined confusion of the strict location test and the question
of what is sufficient minimum maritime connection." 6
Turning to the maritime connection test, the court was faced with
the problem of determining what constitutes sufficient connection. While
noting that most cases require only a minimum connection," the court
insisted that "mere use" of maritime facilities would not justify admiralty
jurisdiction." Accordingly, the court insisted that a substantial relation
to maritime affairs was essential.89 However, the court did not stop at
merely strengthening the requirements of the maritime connection test,
but also set forth five factors particularly relevant to tort cases: (1)
the facilities in use; (2) the relationship of the parties; (3) the activities
of the parties at the time of the tort; (4) the nature and apparent cause
of the accident; and (5) the nature of the injuries sustained."0 These
factors were then utilized to determine whether a substantial maritime
connection existed.
As to the first factor, it is arguable whether the facilities in use
in Peytavin were truly "maritime". The tort occurred while the parties
were waiting to purchase a ticket to board the ferry. Although the facili-
ties were somewhat related to maritime concerns, the facts are no dif-
ferent than the collision of two automobiles waiting to purchase tickets
to a parking garage. Also since the tort occurred between two passengers,
and not between a passenger and someone representing the maritime
84. 453 F.2d at 1126.
85. Id. at 1123. See also Chapman v. City of Grosse Pointe Farms, 385 F.2d 962
(6th Cir. 1967).
86. 453 F.2d at 1126.
87. Watz v. Zapata Off Shore Co., 431 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970); Weinstein
v. Eastern Airlines Inc., 316 F.2d 758 (3rd Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 940
(1963) ; Davis v. City of Jacksonville Beach, 251 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Fla. 1965).
88. 453 F2d at 1126. The Peytavin approach only considers locality as it
relates to the use of a maritime facility; the notion of location is not controlling.
Location is neither a prima facie requirement, as in locality-plus, nor a controlling
consideration, as in strict locality. It should be noted, however, that location is not
irrelevant in every case. Rather, it can be considered in determining whether a "sub-
stantial maritime connection" exists.
89. 453 F.2d at 1126-27.
90. Id.
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industry, the court concluded that no substantial maritime connection
could be found in the relationship of the parties.9 Finally, the accident
did not arise because the pontoon was unseaworthy, or because it was
negligently rammed by a ship or other vessel. Instead, the nature of the
injury and the sequence of events showed that the accident could also
have occurred on land in a variety of situations. Therefore, the last three
factors also failed to establish a substantial maritime connection. 2
By focusing on the facts and circumstances of each case, the Peytavin
formulation seems to achieve the flexibility necessary to insure that
maritime jurisdiction will be extended only to those cases to which the
policies underlying article III, § 2, apply. The correctness of this as-
sumption may be determined by comparing the fifth circuit's approach
with the other tests.
PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF PEYTAVIN FACTORS
Had the Peytavin factors been applied in The Plymouth" the need
for the Admiralty Extension Act" would have been obviated. The facility
involved, a dock where a ship was berthed, was substantially related to
maritime concerns. Since the fire began on the vessel while it was docked,
the activity was sufficiently maritime. The relationship of shipowner to
the warehouseman who stored maritime cargo was also maritime in
nature. Because the fire spread from the ship to the dock, and then to
the warehouse, both the nature of the tort and the damage which re-
sulted were substantially related to maritime concerns. A shipboard fire,
whether at sea or in port, is a common risk in the maritime industry
and should be handled under maritime law. Therefore, an analysis of
The Plymouth under the substantial connection test used in Peytavin
indicates that the plaintiff should have been granted maritime jurisdiction.
Substantial connection to maritime commerce can also be found in
The Blackheath."3 There, the damage occurred when a ship collided with
a navigation beacon. Thus, both the facility and the activity were dis-
tinctly maritime. The relationship of shipowner to the government (act-
ing as the regulator of navigable waters) also shows a substantial mari-
time connection. A collision on navigable waters is inherently maritime,
as is the nature of the injury. Clearly this was a maritime risk which
can be expected to fall within admiralty. Applying Peytavin produces
91. Id. at 1127.
92. Id.
93. 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1866).
94. 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1970).
95. 195 U.S. 361 (1904).
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the same result without necessitating the creation of a special exception
to the prevailing rule.
Similarly, an application of the Peytavin approach would have
secured uniform results in T. Smith and Son v. Taylor 8 and other cases
of injuries suffered by longshoremen while unloading ships. The activity
is maritime because it is an integral part of the transportation process
and involves the use of maritime facilities. The occupations of the parties,
shipowner and longshoremen, and their relationship to each other reflect
a substantial maritime connection. Whether the chain of causal events
was ship-to-dock-to-water as in T. Smith or from ship-to-wharf, the risk
involved is a hazard with which the industry is familiar and concerned.
Under the Peytavin approach all such cases are within admiralty.
Cases like Davis,97 which have presented courts with so many dif-
ficult problems and which result in bizarre decisions, can be uniformly
and easily settled by the use of the Peytavin factors. That case involved
the use of a public swimming area. The facility in use is by definition ex-
cluded from maritime commerce, and recreational pursuits cannot be
considered a maritime activity. The two "civilians" in Davis bore no
relation to the maritime industry, and the nature of the accident and the
injuries suffered show no maritime connection. Therefore, admiralty
jurisdiction should have been denied."
The Peytavin factors succeed where all previous tests have failed.
While each of the factors will not always favor the same result in a
given case, the court by balancing the factors can limit admiralty juris-
diction to cases in which its purposes are served. Balancing is a task with
which the courts are familiar. In a very close case the final determination
may depend on another more general policy of judicial administra-
tion.99 For example, the final balance may sometimes be struck by con-
96. 276 U.S. 179 (1928).
97. Davis v. City of Jacksonville Beach, 251 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Fla. 1965).
98. Similarly, Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 316 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 940 (1963), and the other airplane cases should also fall outside
admiralty jurisdiction. The facilities (airplanes and airports) and the activity of flying
are not related to maritime commerce. Also, the relation of the passenger to the air-
plane is not in any way connected to maritime concerns. The chain of events, from
the negligent inspection to the crash, shows no substantial maritime connection.
Finally, the deaths result from the plane crash, not from drowning, and have only
a slight maritime connection.
99. The Peytavin test offers an adequate method for analysis of the cases involving
pier-based injuries to longshoremen. Use of the Peytavin test in Victory Carriers,
Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, rehearing denied, 404 U.S. 1064 (1971), would have placed
the case outside maritime jurisdiction. In Victory Carriers, a longshoreman was
injured on dock while moving cargo which later was to be loaded onto the ship. The
accident occurred due to a defect in a forklift. Such an accident is a risk which the
shipowner cannot avoid because the defective piece of equipment is not within his
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cerns about the impact that a particular case will have on admiralty
jurisprudence and about ease of administration. It appears, however,
that in the majority of cases the proper jurisdictional determination
can be clearly and easily reached by use of the Peytavin factors.
CONCLUSION
The Peytavin factors approach is no panacea. However, court's
should not wait for a perfect test. As Professor Black has pointed out:
I hope we have all lived too long to think that any verbal
description of jurisdictional limits is going to result in anything
better than a fairly discernable line. The point is that, in draw-
ing the line on the basis of practical relations with an actually
operative industrial complex, we are at least trying to draw it
right, which is more than can be said of the present position."'
Also, the Peytavin test is not logically complete nor obviously better
than any other test; but it is a turning point away from the use of abstract
formulations and towards a practical application of concrete guidelines.
The factors set forth in the opinion are a first step. These factors must
be analyzed and balanced against the concerns of the industry to deter-
mine whether the particular case under consideration is best decided
under the admiralty or civil jurisdiction. For example, one could point
out in Peytavin that an automobile collision, unlike a collision between
vessels, has been adequately provided for under civil jurisdiction. A
special body of rules pertain to automobile accident cases, just as special
rules based on the needs of the maritime industry have been developed
for application in admiralty. Such special rules for cases involving auto-
mobile accidents should take precedence, regardless of where they occur,
unless some substantial relation to maritime concerns exists.
Courts should also consider other general policy guidelines. The
expectations of the parties as to which laws will govern their actions
is one such consideration. Parties often rely on the fact that admiralty
laws will apply to their transactions. The decision to engage in maritime
commerce may be based in part on the belief that admiralty law will
control. Thus, there is only a tenuous relationship between the injury suffered and
maritime concerns. As the dissent points out, it is difficult to draw the jurisdictional
line when at one moment a longshoreman may be working with the ship's gear and
at the next be using shore-based equipment. Therefore, the determination of the
jurisdictional question must be resolved on the basis of policy considerations. If, as
in Victory Carriers, the court decides that civil remedies are sufficient, it may refuse
admiralty jurisdiction.
100. Black, supra note 6, at 280.
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be applied if some hazard of the maritime industry should occur. Simi-
larly, the court should consider whether the risk involved is one expected
in the maritime industry. If the risk is peculiar to maritime activity, the
court is justified in hearing the case on the admiralty side.
The only situations in which the Peytavin approach will deviate
from locality involve parties and activities unrelated to shipping. Thus,
in the swimming and surfing cases admiralty jurisdiction will be denied.
Denying admiralty jurisdiction to such suitors is not unnecessarily harsh
since the claim can be maintained elsewhere. If the disappointed claimant
is able to obtain federal civil jurisdiction, Federal Rule 9(h) allows
him to do so merely by amending his admiralty pleading.' And the
"saving clause" of the Judiciary Act preserves any other remedies to
which he is entitled."0 2 Therefore, no hardship exists which should pre-
vent the limitation of admiralty tort jurisdiction to cases related to the
special concerns of the maritime industry.
THOMAs L. PYTYN A
101. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(h).
102. An Act to Establsh the Judicial Courts of the United States § 9, ch. 20, §
9, 1 Stat. 73 (1789), as aninded 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970). The "saving clause" allows
some cases to be tried in state courts because the "exclusive jurisdiction" of the
admiralty courts has been interpreted to ektend only to cases of maritime liens in an
in rem action. The Hine v. Trevor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 555 (1867) ; The Moses Taylor,
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411 (1867). A suitor with a personal claim which is enforcable
by a personal action in admiralty can elect whether to bring suit in the common law
state court, in admiralty, or, assuming proper jurisdictional grounds, in federal
court on the civil side. Rounds v. Cloverport Foundry and Machine Co., 237 U.S. 303
(1915); Knauff, Stout and Co. v. McCaffrey, 177 U.S. 638 (1900). See generally
BENEDICT, supra note 4, § 23, at 38-42; Gmmom, supra note 2, at 33-36; HANDBOOK,
supra note 14, at 22, 24; RoBERTso, mupra note 8, at 18-27.
